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Ryx and cRake, the first novel of Margaret Atwood’s dys-
topian MaddAddam trilogy, presents the social order of the 
relatively near future as suffering from the effects of environ-
mental degradation and dehumanization caused by a rapacious, global-
ized capitalism. In the novel, what Greg Garrard describes as the 
“corrosive power of modernity” (239) has not been productively resisted 
because democratic protections have been supplanted by neoliberal, 
transnational corporations. This system of domination is overthrown, 
however, once a brilliant geneticist nicknamed Crake engineers and 
unleashes a virus to exterminate humanity. In salvaging what remains of 
the earth’s biosphere from flagrant abuses, Crake’s “supreme act of bio-
terrorism” (Glover 56) aims to make way for the “Crakers” or “Children 
of Crake,” a transgenic, humanoid species that Crake has created as 
a replacement for humans. After “zero hour” has passed and most of 
the people on earth have been murdered, the novel’s central character, 
Jimmy/Snowman, leads the Crakers from their corporate compound 
to a “lethal transgenic-infested environment” (Garrard 238), in which 
numerous other genetically modified animal species reside. Although 
Oryx and Crake speculates in such a way on a post-national and post-
natural future, the novel’s representation of human-animal interactions 
nevertheless resonates with a tradition of animal writing established first 
in Canada in the late nineteenth century. As I will elucidate in what 
follows, Oryx and Crake largely conforms to the conventions of the wild 
animal story, which Atwood was instrumental in identifying as a genre 
in her contentious 1972 study Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian 
Literature. As such, Atwood’s novel inevitably rehearses the expedient 
disavowal of Second World cultural nationalism: ongoing colonizing 
acts are obscured by the text’s privileging of a settler subject-position 
imagined as beset by the imperium of modernity.
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Survival and the Settler Subject
Published six months after James Polk’s 1972 article “Lives of the 
Hunted,” Survival, as John Sandlos observes, “borrows the victimhood 
and survival motifs” that Polk analyzes in the wild animal story “and 
applies them to a wide range of themes in Canadian literature” (74). 
Atwood’s thesis, that “[t]he central symbol for Canada . . . is undoubt-
edly Survival, la Survivance” (Survival 41), quickly produced a num-
ber of detractors, and eventually the scholarly critique that it generated 
extended itself to a broader rejection of thematic criticism’s “national-
referential aesthetic” (Lecker 4). Looking back to this period in her 
introduction to the 2004 edition of Survival, Atwood characteristic-
ally quips, “Who would have suspected that this modest cultural arti-
fact would have got so thoroughly up the noses of some of my elders 
and betters? If the book had sold the three thousand copies initially 
projected, nobody would have bothered their heads about it” (3). By 
Atwood’s own estimation, Survival became “a runaway bestseller” only 
because of the “good timing” of its publication, when “Canada [was] 
showing a renewed interest in its own cultural doings” (3). Yet, despite 
such an assessment, or that scholars now tend to approach Survival 
through the lens of its critique (notably Frank Davey’s seminal 1974 
rebuke “Surviving the Paraphrase”), one might wonder why Survival 
continues to cast such a long shadow.
Part of its continuing influence seems to lie in the siren call of its 
cultural nationalism — for readers either seeking or rejecting the notion 
of a singular Canadian identity. The basis of Atwood’s thesis is the 
belief that the experience of living in Canada is unifying in itself: “Bare 
Survival isn’t a central theme by accident, and neither is the victim 
motif; the land was hard, and we have been (and are) an exploited col-
ony; our literature is rooted in those facts” (41). The homogenizing big 
tent of colonial exploitation here should give “us” pause, however; as 
Alan Lawson observes, “The national is what replaces the indigenous 
and in doing so conceals its participation in colonization by nominat-
ing a new colonized subject — the colonizer or invader-settler” (160). 
Not only does this idea of Canada as the unified colonial victim of 
its imperial masters overlook the ways in which hegemonic discourses 
privilege some groups over others in Canada — particularly in terms 
of race, gender, and/or class, to say nothing of species — but it also 
elides the colonizing status of Canada as, in Lawson’s terms, a “Second 
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World cultural space” (159).1 The politics of national identity in English 
Canada, as a settler colony, has been “formulated as a strategy of resist-
ance toward a dominant culture” (Lawson 159). Glenn Willmott fur-
ther observes that, while constituting “a deep structure in the rhetoric 
of a certain Canadianicity,” this strategy is “based upon ressentiment” 
(133).2 From very early on in its national history, English Canada’s sense 
of inferiority to Great Britain and the United States has been cultur-
ally evidenced by its “anxiety . . . to address its dependency upon and 
belatedness in relation to the metropolitan centre” (Coleman 22-23). As 
the potential causes of this dependency and belatedness, Canada’s harsh 
climate, agrarian economy, and remoteness — “the land was hard” — 
were refigured by an antimodern ressentiment to become the very aspects 
that define Canada’s distinct goodness relative to the “overcivilization” 
of its more socially “advanced” metropoles.3 
The curious disregard for even the most obvious of social differ-
ences among Canadians in Survival in my view results from an “iden-
tity politics [that] asserts the uniqueness and the homogeneity of the 
group in the hope that its undivided (if specious) unity will empower it 
against the apparent seamlessness of the hegemonic discourse” (Lawson 
160). Survival, then, is perceptive in detecting a thematic ressentiment 
in Canadian writing — that is, the self-serving assumption that “the 
rigours of life in a stern, unaccommodating climate demand strength 
of body, character and mind while . . . [they] winnow away laziness, 
overindulgence, and false social niceties” (Coleman 24). What Survival 
is unaware of, however, is its own participation in the fantasy gener-
ated by this ressentiment: that Canadianness results from surviving the 
twin antagonisms of the local and the foreign, “the environment or the 
Empire” (Mackey 49). Indeed, Atwood’s 2004 edition of Survival con-
tinues to leave us at the impasse of antimodern ressentiment by updating 
her original allegation that “the Americans are taking over” (41) with a 
warning to Canadians of “increased U.S. domination brought about by 
the 1989 Free Trade Agreement” (9).
Nonetheless, if we even tentatively accept Atwood’s themes of survival 
and victimhood as part of “a persistent cultural obsession” (8) — her 
significant 2004 rephrasing of her “sweeping generalization . . . that 
every country or culture has a single unifying and informing symbol 
at its core” (40) — then it is possible to view the pattern of textual rep-
resentation that Survival isolates as indicative of a prevalent narrative 
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strategy to resolve a fundamental contradiction of Canadian experience. 
As part of the Second World, one of a number of “liminal sites at the 
point of negotiation between the contending authorities of Empire and 
Native” (Lawson 155), Canada is both “colonizing and colonized” (156). 
As such, not all colonial subjects are interpellated in the same way, so 
what Lawson identifies as the settler subject enjoys the greatest privilege 
in Canadian society, as “the very type of nonunified subject and the very 
distillation of colonial power, the place where the operations of colonial 
power as negotiation are most intensely visible” (155).4 Yet, suspended as 
it is “between ‘mother’ and ‘other’” (155), this subject-position is faced 
with “always two kinds of authority and always two kinds of authenticity 
that the settler subject is con/signed to desire and disavow” (156). While 
on the one side there is the authenticity and authority of the imperial 
enterprise that the settler subject represents and is separated from, on 
the other there is the authenticity and authority of the indigene, who — 
along with the land — is an object of the settler subject’s desire (156).
Settler cultures have attempted to textualize a resolution to this 
contradictory position by recourse to romantic fantasy, which Lawson 
distinguishes as “a long series of narratives of psychic encounter and 
indigenization” (156).5 For the settler subject, the “task is to go native, 
not to become gone native” (Goldie 215). As Lawson further explains, 
“The need, then, is to displace the other rather than replace him; but 
the other must remain to signify the boundary of the self, to confirm 
the subjectivity of the invader-settler” (157). This interminable process 
of “becoming indigenous” (Goldie 13), however, implies a similarly 
continuous abnegation of any attribute considered foreign to the set-
tler culture, including those of “the atavistic inhabitant of the cultural 
homeland whom [the settler subject] is also reduced to mimicking” 
(Lawson 158). As I have proposed elsewhere (see Frew), the word exogen-
eity can be used to describe those subjective qualities of foreign other-
ness that settler societies invoke for the purposes of self-definition. The 
derivations exogene and exogenous would thus apply to any subjectivity 
viewed as beginning outside the political boundaries of a given settler 
society, whether internal or external to a given nation-state.6 Indeed, 
the authority and authenticity of that settler culture rely on indigen-
ization as a concomitant process of de-exogenization to apportion for 
itself a moral superiority to its claim on the land. When not effaced 
outright as absent, the indigenous — the indigene, the wild animal, 
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the landscape — is survived by the settler subject in terms of hostile or 
romantic encounter. Correspondingly, when not dismissed outright as 
barbaric, the exogenous — the migrant, the cosmopolitan, the imper-
ium — is victimizing and enviable in terms of antimodern ressentiment.7 
The concept of exogeneity is therefore as critical as that of indigeneity in 
discussions of Canadian settler subjectivity because “cultural difference 
and pluralism may be highlighted to distinguish from external ‘others’ 
. . . [and] managed internally so as to reproduce the structuring of dif-
ferences around a dominant culture” (Mackey 28-29). 
When textualized as indigenization narratives, the “anxiety of prox-
imity” between the settler and the indigene (Lawson 157) thus extends 
to the exogene as well. Although the settler subject “acquires Indian” 
without becoming one (Goldie 215), these narratives are also concerned 
with policing the borders of settler subjectivity by precluding the exo-
gene from indigenization. In the wild animal story specifically, this 
triangulated schema is traditionally mediated by human-animal inter-
actions predicated on a character’s proficiency in woodcraft, a discipline 
that the exogene is invariably shown as being incapable of mastering. A 
complex form of specialized knowledge, the word woodcraft, as defined 
by the Oxford English Dictionary, “(chief ly N. Amer., Austral., etc.) 
applie[s] esp. to such knowledge of forest conditions as enables one to 
maintain oneself or make one’s way” (“woodcraft”). More specifically, 
woodcraft includes the survival skills necessary to live in the wilderness, 
such as camping, hunting, and fishing, but it also includes the ability 
to identify plants and animals, an understanding of animal behaviours, 
and training in wilderness first aid.8 Representing what Roberts would 
call a “part of the wisdom of the ages,” this skill set bestows on its pos-
sessor in the wild animal story a naturalized feeling of belonging in the 
untamed landscape without requiring a “return to barbarism” (29). The 
exogene, however, lacks the settler subject’s woodcraft because of some 
atavistic f law, most commonly either an inherent unintelligence or an 
overcivilized unfeeling.9 Woodcraft as learning “the ways of the land” 
thus reinforces differentiation among colonial subjects in Second World 
cultural spaces as a strategy of settler indigenization.
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The Wild Animal Story and Oryx and Crake
The third chapter of Survival is devoted to “Animal Victims,” and here 
Atwood describes the “‘realistic’ animal story, as invented by Ernest 
Thompson Seton and Sir Charles G.D. Roberts” in the late nineteenth 
century, as a “genre which provides a key to an important facet of the 
Canadian psyche” (87). She then goes on to refute Alec Lucas’s view 
in A Literary History of Canada that the wild animal story had “long 
passed” since its “heyday in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries” (qtd. 90). She cites Fred Bodsworth’s Last of the Curlews and 
Farley Mowat’s Never Cry Wolf as contemporary examples of the genre: 
The difference between the earlier Seton and Roberts stories and 
the later . . . ones is that in the former it is the individual only who 
dies; the species remains. But The Last of the Curlews [sic] is, as its 
name implies, the story of the death of a species, and Mowat indi-
cates that not just the wolves but also the caribou and with them 
the whole Arctic ecological balance is threatened by the white man’s 
short-sighted and destructive policies. Man is again the villain, but 
on a much larger scale. (91)
Atwood’s sense of the intensification of environmental threat in the 
development of the genre holds true, and it is later echoed in Graeme 
Gibson’s afterword to the 1991 New Canadian Library edition of Last 
of the Curlews. As Gibson observes, “It is a commonplace that we live 
in an ‘Age of Extinctions’ — with technical man as The Exterminator. 
It therefore seems both appropriate and necessary that the individual 
tragedies found in earlier animal stories . . . be now ‘upgraded’ to the 
death of a species” (131). Oryx and Crake, set after the death of nature, 
the end of national sovereignty, and the near-total extermination of 
humans, can thus be understood as one possible “upgrade” in this teleol-
ogy of escalating endangerment. Its futuristic setting, however, remains 
firmly grounded in the present. As Noah Richler writes, “The entire 
litany of disasters in Oryx and Crake is already familiar to us: man-made 
viruses, cryogenics, genetically manipulated foods and animals, and 
climate change. We have sown the seeds of these processes already.” 
For Atwood, writing speculative fiction means that “[y]ou have to be 
able to back everything up with facts” (qtd. in Richler). In part because 
she limited herself to writing about technologies that have already been 
developed — she kept a “big, brown box in the cellar” to file away such 
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information (qtd. in Richler) — Oryx and Crake, regrettably since it is 
dystopian, is a realistic wild animal story.
Once Atwood establishes in “Animal Victims” that the genre con-
tinues past the early twentieth century, she sketches a number of its 
conventions. The features that she outlines, however, tend to ref lect 
her overarching nationalist concerns rather than provide an accurate 
description of the wild animal story. As Sandlos remarks, Atwood, to 
support her larger argument, discusses the genre largely in terms of 
“Polk’s thesis of the American hunter and the Canadian victim” (74), 
a position that allegorizes endangered and dying animals in these stor-
ies as Canadians who feel “threatened and nearly-extinct as a nation” 
(Atwood, Survival 95). Yet a more thorough survey of the large corpora 
of Seton and Roberts reveals that they are neither “almost invariably 
failure stories” (88) nor necessarily “told from the point of view of the ani-
mal” (88-89; emphasis in original), nor do they, even in their decidedly 
post-Darwinian context, “present animals as victims” (90). Although 
the wild animals in these stories are unequivocally anthropomorphic — 
Atwood rightly notes that “‘realism’ in connection with animal stories 
must always be a somewhat false claim” (74) — this anthropomorph-
ism does not necessarily mean that they directly represent the human. 
Misao Dean, for instance, takes a more nuanced approach in her more 
recent study of Roberts’s stories, arguing that the representation of these 
animals is “inflected with assumptions about human personality and 
masculinity as norm” (1; emphasis added). Her argument can readily 
be extended to the genre as a whole, in which wild animals function as 
“(m)animals, reproductions of the ideological subject offered to turn-
of-the-century readers of realist fiction” (5). Although she observes that 
they “masquerade as ‘other’” (5), these wild animal representations, as 
her neologism suggests, retain some degree of signification for animal-
ity. Indeed, conflating these wild animals with humans into a single 
metaphor does not adequately account for the indigenizing function of 
the wild animal story.
In this genre, the wild animal must represent a radical alterity to 
convey that nature, as an antimodern space open exclusively to the 
settler subject, cannot be colonized by exogenous forces. As with the 
indigene, the indigeneity of the wild animal “must be approached but 
never touched,” since the settler “is to displace the other rather than 
replace him” (Lawson 157). To achieve such an end, the discursive strat-
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egy of the wild animal story has traditionally been to valorize wood-
craft discourse while insisting on a Darwinian kinship between humans 
and animals. Once again wild animals are then able, like the indigene, 
to “demonstrate a potential bridge to the freedom of the non-man in 
nature” (Goldie 25). Although I agree with Sandlos’s argument that “the 
stories are about human relationships to animals, about how observed 
animal behavior . . . positions them in relation to ‘us’ within a larger 
ecological and philosophical framework” (75), I would hasten to add 
that this framework itself is mediated by “our” Second World history in 
North America. Indeed, it is precisely because they are indigenization 
narratives that “It is upon this boundary between human and animal, 
instinct and reason, biological fact and creative myth that the animal 
stories of Seton and Roberts sit, along with much of the subsequent 
Canadian animal literature that has appeared in the last century” 
(Sandlos 75-76). 
Brian Johnson takes a similar position in his discussion of “the 
strategic blurring of the species boundary” in Mowat’s Never Cry Wolf 
(337). Explaining that the wild animal story is “an important site for the 
exploration of ecological themes and the popularization of conservation-
ist ideals” (334), he observes that, to pursue their conservation goals, 
practitioners of the wild animal story such as Seton, Roberts, Grey 
Owl, Mowat, and Bodsworth regularly contested the species boundary 
to insist on “a fundamental kinship between animal and human sub-
jects” (335). As with Oryx and Crake, the transgression of this boundary 
in Never Cry Wolf works as a conservation strategy while at the same 
time “overlap[ping] with and reinforc[ing] cultural metanarratives of 
romantic nationalism and indigenization, creating a veiled ‘postcolonial’ 
allegory” (337). Whereas Johnson ultimately argues that “Never Cry 
Wolf demonstrates the way in which the violation of species boundaries 
in conservationist discourse” provides for an animal “indigeneity that 
cannot answer back and contest the desires of settler-invader national-
ism” (350), Oryx and Crake takes a different tack by initially depicting 
a nightmarish future in which indigenization is impossible because this 
animal indigeneity has been overrun by modernity. That is, the rus-
tic bridge that once imaginatively connected the settler subject to an 
imaginary freedom of nature has been paved over in Atwood’s novel by 
an oppressive, exogenous modernity.
However, once zero hour has come to pass, Oryx and Crake pre-
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sents the obverse of what Johnson reads as the conservationist rhet-
orical strategy at the end of Never Cry Wolf. Rather than concluding 
with Mowat’s “reassertion of the species boundary through the rhetoric 
of self-exclusion” (349) to deny the reader “a virtual or utopian pos-
sibility” of indigenization and “interspecies harmony” (348), Atwood’s 
novel leaves this boundary wrenched open so that transgenic species can 
repopulate a recreated wilderness as the nominations of new forms of 
indigeneity. That is, the SF future of Oryx and Crake enables a fantasy 
of indigenization in which both the colonial need to survive nature 
resurfaces and the lost objects of primitive wilderness are resurrected 
after the fall of modernity. Crake’s Paradice Project in effect successfully 
initiates the rebirth of the Second World, in which the settler subject’s 
proximity to indigeneity can be imagined as playing out in the morally 
improving context of rigorous pioneer life: surviving a hostile indigen-
ous environment as the victim of exogenous forces.
Before zero hour can resurrect settler identity politics in this way, 
however, the novel presents nature as having become entirely subju-
gated by modernity or what Philip Armstrong describes as “a world in 
ruins as the legacy of the modern constitution” (173). For instance, the 
effects of anthropogenic climate change are total: “the coastal aquifers 
turned salty and the northern permafrost melted and the vast tundra 
bubbled with methane, and the drought in the midcontinental plains 
regions went on and on, and the Asian steppes turned to sand dunes” 
(Atwood, Oryx 24). As part of its warning of a dystopian future, the 
novel also reveals that many wild animals — a “long, long list” — have 
become extinct (344). However, such a representation of “the projected 
extinction of animal species,” as Johnson observes of Mowat, “when 
read in [its] national-postcolonial context” (339), also evokes the “‘per-
formative’ discourse of proleptic elegy” (338), a paradigmatic feature of 
indigenization narratives by which the loss of indigenous objects might 
be lamented as the outcome of fate rather than colonization. Although 
traditionally this discourse has been employed to sanctify “indigenous 
effacement and appropriation” (338) as the natural results of competi-
tion between civilization and savagery, in Oryx and Crake it is used to 
effect the text’s dire warnings. The first warning, of course, concerns 
the future of wildlife — recall here Richler describing the novel’s bleak 
future as “already familiar to us” because “[w]e have sown the seeds 
of these processes already.” What might be less familiar, however, and 
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therefore might lead to even greater disquiet, is the novel’s more abstract 
second warning: the settler subject-position will be lost in the future to 
modernity. Not only is this a world in which mass extinction can be 
commodified as an online computer game, but it is also one in which 
Crake and Jimmy can be so entertained by playing it. Their lack of 
humane concern for the environment is emphasized by the narrator’s 
ironic description of “Extinctathon” as “an interactive biofreak master-
lore game,” which has its competitors challenge each other to name 
“some bioform that had kakked out within the past fifty years” (80). “It 
helped,” the narrator also informs us, for Crake and Jimmy to consult 
a list maintained by the Extinctathon website of every extinct species, 
even though it is “a couple of hundred pages of fine print and filled with 
obscure bugs, weeds, and frogs nobody had ever heard of” (81). In the 
absence of nature, the novel’s main characters are precluded from the 
process of settler indigenization because they embody the overcivilized 
unfeeling of the exogene.
In addition to the various environmental factors that have led to the 
widespread annihilation of wild animals, Oryx and Crake heightens the 
urgency of its ecological warning with its ingenious violations of the spe-
cies boundary. As Jayne Glover observes, “It is the confusion of bound-
aries which is partly what allows Crake to assume that the natural world 
— including its human inhabitants — is part of an enormous laboratory 
which he has the right to control” (53). As a member of an elite corporate 
scientist class living within the protected compounds, Crake displays a 
lack of ethical consideration of “instrumentalist meddling with nature” 
that is problematized by the financial gains that motivate his class’s sci-
entific research (53). Intended to generate corporate profits, the numer-
ous transgenic species created by Crake and his fellow genetic engineers 
are in effect self-reproducing environmental pollutants replacing rather 
than simply displacing nature. Transgenic plants threaten to “spread, 
make inroads, choke out the native plants” (228), and the proliferation 
of transgenic animals, whose unimaginative names belie their monstrous-
ness, have made “[t]he whole world now,” as the narrator remarks, “one 
vast uncontrolled experiment . . . and the doctrine of unintended conse-
quences is in full spate” (228). Because the corporations that have created 
them do not value language, which the growth of their high-technology 
industries has long been outpacing, they use simplistic neologisms — 
such as rakunks (raccoon-skunk hybrids), wolvogs (wolf-dogs), spoat/
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giders (spider-goats), snats (snake-rats), and bobkittens (bobcat-cats) — in 
a sad parody of Genesis.
Perhaps the most immediately threatening boundary crossing in 
the novel involves the pigoons that Jimmy’s father helps to create as a 
genetic engineer at the OrganInc Farms Compound. These animals, 
formally sus multiorganifer, have been designed “to grow an assortment 
of foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host — 
organs that would transplant smoothly and avoid rejection, but would 
also be able to fend off attacks by opportunistic microbes and viruses, 
of which there were more strains every year” (22). The narrator con-
tinues, “now they were perfecting a pigoon that could grow five or 
six kidneys at a time. Such a host animal could be reaped of its extra 
kidneys; then, rather than being destroyed, it could keep on living and 
grow more organs” (22-23). The text initially casts aspersions on the 
human-animal kinship of transgenic species by employing the trope of 
cannibalism: despite the official claim of OrganInc Farms that “none 
of the defunct pigoons ended up as bacon and sausages [because] no 
one would want to eat an animal whose cells might be identical with at 
least some of their own” (23-24), the workers at the compound cannot 
help but notice “how often back bacon and ham sandwiches and pork 
pies turned up on the staff café menu” (24). When Jimmy’s father then 
announces the success of his “neuro-regeneration project,” in which his 
team has “genuine human neo-cortex tissue growing in a pigoon” (56), 
Jimmy’s mother protests and leaves him and Jimmy to enter the political 
underground. She responds to her husband’s professional enthusiasm by 
stating derisively, “That’s all we need. . . . More people with the brains 
of pigs. Don’t we have enough of those already?” (56). Her objection 
to his work purposely confuses the direction of its boundary crossing 
and by doing so references The Odyssey, in which the sorceress Circe 
transforms the men accompanying Odysseus into pigs. Far from seeing 
his father’s work as an important contribution to the common good, 
Jimmy’s mother fittingly likens it to black magic: “What you’re doing 
— this pig brain thing. You’re interfering with the building blocks of 
life. It’s immoral. It’s . . . sacrilegious” (57; ellipsis in the original). 
At the least, the pigoons represent a considerable danger to Snowman 
after Crake’s virus wipes out the human population, and the text raises 
the spectre of cannibalism again to reiterate the threat that exogenous 
modernity presents to the settler subject-position: “Those beasts are 
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clever enough to fake a retreat, then lurk around the next corner. They’d 
bowl him over, trample him, rip him open, munch up his organs first. 
He knows their tastes. A brainy and omnivorous animal, the pigoon. 
Some of them may even have human neocortex tissue growing in their 
crafty, wicked heads” (Atwood, Oryx 235). Their craftiness, wickedness, 
and penchant for cannibalism, while all aspects of the pigoons’ alter-
ity, are nevertheless characteristics that can be traced back to the labs 
and lunchrooms of Jimmy’s father and his team at OrganInc Farms. 
Moreover, such monstrous hybridity presents the opposite of the ideal of 
indigenized settler subjectivity: degenerated atavistically into the body 
of an animal, this “human neocortex tissue” is also exogenized by both 
the pigoon’s status as a commodity and the Old World origins of “the 
pig host” itself.
Because transgenic techno-science is presented as monstrous in 
Oryx and Crake, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) is often read as 
one of its intertexts. For instance, Glover characterizes Atwood’s novel 
as “a postmodern remaking of the Frankenstein story” (52), and Mark 
McCutcheon observes that “Atwood’s plot . . . adapts both Frankenstein 
and The Last Man, Shelley’s 1826 novel about the world of 2097” (217). 
In a similar vein, Giuseppina Botta contends that “Crake embodies 
the Faustian myth, the representation of an insatiable desire both for 
knowledge and for possession” (249). In each of these intertexts, the 
nature of that knowledge — as dangerous, hyper-modern, and exogen-
ous — gestures to the dystopian aspect of Oryx and Crake most pertin-
ent to settler subjectivity: in the absence of the indigenizing Bildung of 
nature in an SF future, the settler subject remains into adulthood the 
exogene of a globalized social order. That Crake wishes to use the same 
techno-scientific knowledge of a corrupt system to bring it down thus 
positions him, in antimodern terms, as heroic. He is hopelessly flawed 
as an exogene, and his actions lead to his death and the downfall of his 
social order, all of which is replaced by another of reduced scale.
Perhaps to assert that he is a villain outright for committing mass 
murder, many critics limit themselves to “read[ing] Crake through the 
‘mad scientist’ archetype” (Spiegel 120). Such a view is too limited, 
however, since, in spite of his emotional detachment, his actions are not 
only deliberate but also rationally motivated by revenge.10 When Jimmy 
visits Crake at the Watson-Crick Institute, Crake tells him that his 
father was murdered by the compound for which he had worked: “He 
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was going to do some whistle-blowing,” Crake says, because HelthWyzer 
for years had been creating new diseases and spreading them in its vita-
min pills (212). “That’s how come they pushed him off a bridge,” Crake 
calmly tells Jimmy (211). Since neither of these secrets has ever been 
exposed, Crake reasonably adapts the same model of distribution for 
his own virus and the same method of disposal for the scientists whom 
he sequesters who refuse to cooperate with his plan. Indeed, as Hannes 
Bergthaller also observes, “it is quite clear that Crake, underneath his 
veneer of cynical aloofness, nourishes a deep disgust of the world he 
grows up in, and that he is motivated not by greed but by a genuine 
desire to change it” (735). His awareness of the risks involved in his sedi-
tious plan is evidenced by the name that he gives to his Paradice Project 
at the RejoovenEsense Compound in which he works. Although the 
complex that houses the Crakers might be “a living space which reminds 
one of the Bible’s Earthly Paradise, full of all kinds of vegetation, and 
his inhabitants really recall Adam and Eve” (Botta 251), Paradice also 
clearly puns on “pair of dice.” The wordplay here indicates that Crake 
has clearly understood that his whole project is a dangerous gamble.
Of course, his plan to replace humanity with the Crakers goes well 
beyond his desire to bring down the system. After all, a far less extreme 
act of bioterrorism could be devastating enough for the globalized mod-
ernity of the novel, presented as already both transient and precarious. 
As Crake himself claims, if “civilization as we know it gets destroyed,” 
then, “[o]nce it’s flattened, it could never be rebuilt” (223). He explains 
to Jimmy that this is “[b]ecause all the available surface metals have 
already been mined” and that even with the “metals farther down . . . 
the advanced technology we need for extracting those would have been 
obliterated” (223). “It’s not like the wheel,” he adds, “it’s too complex 
now. Suppose the instructions survived, suppose there were any people 
left with the knowledge to read them. Those people would be few and 
far between, and they wouldn’t have the tools” (223). It is telling that 
the novel informs the reader of all this without explicating why Crake 
thinks it necessary to take the extra step of replacing humanity once he 
has already wiped it out. His unexplained desire to create a new species 
of hominid is in fact the novel’s priority: to resurrect the settler subject-
position in a recreated Second World populated by individuals who can 
claim a superior connection to it.
Snowman’s position as caretaker of the Crakers is unenviable 
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not only because he has not chosen it for himself but also because, 
as Bergthaller notes, the Crakers “are far better adapted to this new 
world than Snowman, who is painfully aware of his own atavism” 
(734). Genetically comprised of a “variety of features from the animal 
kingdom” (Glover 55), the Crakers can be read as examples of Donna 
Haraway’s liberatory image of the cyborg and “initially do seem to be 
a practical path to a utopian world based on some kind of ecological 
ethic” (Glover 54). Ostensibly, the utopian aspect of the Crakers is that 
they cannot modernize since biologically they lack the complexities of 
the “ancient primate brain,” described by the narrator as its “destruc-
tive features, the features responsible for the world’s current illnesses” 
(305). Designed to live in harmony with their environment and one 
another, they are vegans who do not require territory to hunt or farm, 
“lack the neural complexes” that would create social hierarchies (305), 
and are “programmed to drop dead at age thirty” (303). Additionally, 
they embody animal traits resulting from numerous gene splices, which 
give them a competitive advantage over humans: they have lumines-
cent green eyes, they purr to heal wounds, they produce caecotrophs 
to digest cellulose, they reproduce only when the women are in estrus, 
and the men mark their territory twice daily with chemically enhanced 
urine to deter predators. Although they might thus ref lect “many of 
the principles familiar to us through ecological philosophy” (Glover 
59), the Crakers as such also appeal — and herein lies their underlying 
utopian aspect — to indigenizing fantasies of incorruptible, primeval 
indigeneity. By standing in as post-human indigenes, the Crakers serve 
as the noble savages from whom Snowman might continuously attempt 
to “acquir[e] Indian” (Goldie 215). In the section titled “Remnant,” the 
narrator explains why he changes his name to Snowman: “He needed 
to forget the past — the distant past, the immediate past, the past in 
any form. He needed to exist only in the present, without guilt, with-
out expectation. As the Crakers did. Perhaps a different name would 
do that for him” (348-49). That is, the fall of modernity has rendered 
Jimmy — the selfish, weak-willed, and irresponsible cad — obsolete, 
and Snowman sees the Crakers as something to emulate or become, all 
while attempting to shield them from exogenous threats.11 
Interestingly, the name that he chooses for himself, shortened from 
Abominable Snowman, also suggests his exogenous status. The narra-
tor explains the name’s allure for him: “The Abominable Snowman — 
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existing and not existing, f lickering at the edges of blizzards, apelike 
man or manlike ape, stealthy, elusive, known only through rumours 
and through its backward-pointing footprints” (7-8). As defined by the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the word abominable is derived from “ab hom-
ine away from man, inhuman” (“abominable”), so Snowman’s choice 
of name represents both his liminality as potentially the lone human 
survivor of the pandemic and his atavistic unbelonging relative to the 
Crakers. “On some non-conscious level,” the narrator later informs us, 
“Snowman must serve as a reminder to these people, and not a pleas-
ant one: he’s what they may have been once. I’m your past, he might 
intone. I’m your ancestor, come from the land of the dead. Now I’m lost, 
I can’t get back, I’m stranded here, I’m all alone. Let me in!” (106). His 
potential to occupy the settler subject-position in Crake’s new world, 
however, is ultimately left unrealized within the dystopian context of 
the novel’s conservationist appeal. From the outset of the novel, it is 
clear that Snowman lacks the knowledge needed to survive outside a 
built environment, and it seems he also lacks the wherewithal to develop 
his woodcraft in the field. Instead, he spends his time getting drunk 
while pining for the dead Oryx, uncomfortably sleeping in a tree to 
escape hybrid animal predators, and slowly starving to death in spite of 
his reliance on a weekly offering of fish from the Crakers. Simply put, 
Snowman’s previous life as Jimmy has not prepared him for roughing it 
in the bush. Not only is he permanently alienated from the Crakers, but 
he also cannot stop identifying with the old world. Because his experi-
ence of being exiled from humanity remains so painful, he crucially 
“ke[eps] the abominable to himself, his own secret hair shirt” (8).12 
Snowman’s status as an exogene is further emphasized by the onto-
logical loss he experiences while trying to frame his interactions with the 
Crakers. He considers his relation to them as a colonial one, continu-
ing a line of thinking from the start of the novel in which he imagi-
nes the recommendations made in “a book, some obsolete, ponderous 
directive written in aid of European colonials running plantations of 
one kind or another” (4). Later, having led the Crakers safely from 
the RejoovenEsense Compound to the seashore as per Crake’s request, 
Snowman copes with his frustration by turning once again to colonial 
discourse. The narrator states,
When dealing with indigenous peoples, says the book in his head — 
a more modern book this time, late twentieth century, the voice a 
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confident female’s — you must attempt to respect their traditions and 
confine your explanations to simple concepts that can be understood 
within the contexts of their belief systems. Some earnest aid worker in 
a khaki jungle outfit, with netting under the arms and a hundred 
pockets. Condescending self-righteous cow, thinks she’s got all the 
answers. He’d known girls like that at college. If she were here she’d 
need a whole new take on indigenous. (97)
His misogyny aside, Snowman makes the pertinent observation that the 
collapse of humanity and the introduction of the Crakers have altered 
previous conceptions and relations of identity. It is telling, however, 
that, because these upheavals are framed in colonial terms, zero hour 
has permitted Snowman a return to the Second World, however brief 
his stay might be. Like Crake, Snowman is hopelessly exogenous, and 
the impossibility of his continued belonging is foreshadowed by the 
incongruity of his name in the crushing heat of the Anthropocene.
In its bid to warn the reader of a looming dark age ahead, Oryx and 
Crake participates in the linked romantic fantasies of indigenization 
and ressentiment to valorize the settler subject-position. Until Crake is 
able to overthrow his dystopian social order, settler indigenization has 
been rendered impossible by the demise of nature at the hands of global-
ized capitalism. In eradicating most of the world’s human population 
with a virus that he engineers, Crake is able to recreate a wilderness to 
repopulate with a transgenic humanoid species of his own making. The 
claim to this wilderness of these post-human indigenes exceeds that 
of the humans who survive Crake’s pandemic because they have been 
designed to live in this inhospitable environment. The representational 
economy made possible by Crake’s Paradice Project signals a propitious 
resurrection of the Second World in Oryx and Crake, and, despite the 
open possibilities of an SF future, indicates the limits of our colonial 
episteme. As such, the novel conforms to the conventions and discursive 
strategies of the wild animal story, a genre that Atwood was pivotal 
in first defining in the 1970s. The contradiction presented by Second 
World cultural spaces as both colonizing and colonized prompts such 
writing, which imaginatively resolves the settler subject’s “dilemma of 
anxious unbelonging” (Johnson 338) and attempts to mitigate his or 
her culpability in ongoing historical injustices.
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Notes
1 Rather than referring to the former Eastern Bloc countries, Lawson’s notion of the 
Second World corresponds to “more or less that part of colonial space occupied by the 
postimperial, so-called settler colonies” (152). Lawson further notes that his “suggestion is 
to recognize the Second World of the settler as a place caught between two First Worlds, 
two origins of authority and authenticity: the originating world of Europe, the imperium, 
as source of the Second World’s principal cultural authority; and that other First World, 
that of the First Nations, whose authority the settlers not only effaced and replaced but 
also desired” (158).
2 In his discussion of how this Nietzschean concept relates to Canadian national iden-
tity, Willmott provides a particularly clear definition of ressentiment as an “ideological con-
dition” in which “the group identity of the weak as constituted by an ‘imaginary revenge’ 
against the strong, which heroizes its own victimization and prophetically envisions a 
metaphysical justice beyond or above history, in which the moral superiority that has been 
alienated from power is vindicated. It is a group identity based upon negation of an oppos-
ing identity rather than the positive creation of a new one. To cast light on this inverted 
repetition, and the obsessively internal activities of envy, recall, and self-conscious reflection 
demanded of it, Nietzsche reinvents for the category of ‘imaginary revenge’ a French word, 
ressentiment” (133-34).
3 Antimodern sentiment, according to the historian T.J. Jackson Lears, was widespread 
throughout Europe and America at the turn of the twentieth century, and “the feeling of 
overcivilization . . . was a sign of a broader transatlantic dissatisfaction with modern culture 
in all its dimensions” (4). For more on antimodernism, see his seminal work No Place of 
Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920.
4 Although the Canadian settler subject corresponds to “the dominant white 
Anglophone majority” (16), as Eva Mackey also explains, “To study ‘whiteness’ is not to 
suggest that all white people are the same, or that whiteness is a biologically relevant cat-
egory” (34). Nevertheless, “In Canada . . . the white Anglophone majority undoubtedly has 
cultural, economic, and political dominance. If Canada is the ‘very house of difference’, it 
contains a family with a distinct household head” (25).
5 As a cultural phenomenon first described by Terry Goldie as “the impossible necessity 
of becoming indigenous” (13), indigenization involves both the discursive integration of 
settler cultures into their physical environments and the discursive management of what 
Goldie further identifies as the image of the indigene to justify the ongoing dispossession, 
oppression, and effacement of Aboriginals (9).
6 I derive exogeneity and exogene as nominalizations of the adjectives exogenetic and 
exogenous, synonyms that generally mean “[h]aving an external cause or origin” (“exogen-
etic”). The exogene is thus understood as having biological and/or social origins external to 
the settler society that imagines it. Because exogeneity is determined by arbitrary criteria, 
to say nothing of the eliding of the exogenous origins of the settler subject, it should be 
unsurprising that the image of the exogene does not correspond reliably to any referent 
homeland.
7 My discussion of the ways in which Canadian ressentiment imagines the exogenous as 
a threat relates well to Robin Mathews’s reading of John Richardson’s 1832 novel Wacousta. 
Mathews believes that “the tensions inherent in Canadian survival, character and definition 
of being” (13) derive from a dialectical relation not between the exogenous and the indigen-
ous but between settler subjectivity and the exogenous. By pitting Colonel Charles De 
Haldimar, “representing the ‘law and order’ philosophy of the British Empire” (13), against 
Wacousta, who is a “compellingly attractive representative of despotic anarchism incarnated 
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in its richest expression in the new world of British North America” (13), Richardson “can 
place in conf lict as character types representatives of the political philosophies he sees as 
typical of the British and American” (14; emphasis in original). As a typical example of 
“the Canadian phenomenon of double-rejection” (25), both political models are firmly 
repudiated by the novel, as neither exogenous figure is “fit to rule what is today Canada: 
a synthesis of them, eventuating in a new generation[,] and a new philosophy is required” 
(14). Once again, however, we see the settler subject-position idealized and homogenized (if 
not indigenized) by Second World identity politics. Mathews claims, less convincingly, that 
“Canadian experience and Canadian literature reveal that the battle is not between garrison 
and wilderness — a polite way of saying white man and native. The battle is between an 
alien exploiter or imperialist class and the settlers or community builders” (19).
8 Woodcraft features more heavily later in the MaddAddam trilogy. Most notably, 
members of the God’s Gardeners, an eco-centric religious cult, prepare themselves for 
the end of the “Exfernal world” and the creation of “a New Eden” in The Year of the Flood 
(2009). Their efforts to grow and store food, practice and disseminate medical knowledge, 
and learn basic survival skills pay off by the end of MaddAddam (2013) since many of 
them survive the fall of modernity and are able to start rebuilding a workable community.
9 My dissertation focused in part on the representation of humans in the animal stories 
of Roberts and Seton. Exogeneity in their works is mostly embodied in figures of squatters 
and trophy hunters. The former, such as Mrs. Gammit in Roberts’s “Mrs. Gammit and the 
Porcupines” (1911) and Cuddy in Seton’s “Redruff, The Story of the Don Valley Partridge” 
(1898), tend to be marked by their use of dialect or non-standard English. The latter, such 
as those in Roberts’s “A Treason of Nature” (1902) and Seton’s “Krag, The Kootenay Ram” 
(1901), are made callous by their ignorance of basic woodcraft principles.
10 Michael Spiegel makes a compelling argument that, rather than “evidence of an 
author’s waning storytelling skills” (120), as some critics have implied with their complaints 
of “cardboardy” characterization in Oryx and Crake (119), the emotional detachment of 
Atwood’s characters here is more ref lective of the novel’s post-national context, in which 
“shouldering multiple loyalties and identities” might require, in Jamesonian terms, “embra-
cing ‘the waning of affect’” (128).
11 Later in the MaddAddam trilogy Snowman is joined by a number of other human 
survivors of Crake’s pandemic who can be read as settler subjects. Belonging mainly to the 
ranks of the God’s Gardeners and MaddAddamites, they work as benevolent pioneers and 
protect the Crakers from roving exogenes such as the atavistic Painballers.
12 Although Snowman’s inability to learn survival skills may be understandable in 
light of the severity of his circumstances, it nevertheless stands in sharp contrast with the 
views of the God’s Gardeners featured later in the trilogy, who renounce modernity and 
welcome its demise.
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